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 Development of marginal hydrocarbon fields is becoming the topic of interest among oil 
and gas industry players. In Malaysia, Risk Service Contract (RSC) is used for development of 
marginal fields. This paper will investigate the viability of Malaysian RSC implementation. The 
objectives of this research are to conduct comparative analyses between conventional PSC and 
RSC, between local RSC and foreign RSC; to evaluate current fiscal agreements for marginal 
fields; and to recommend methods to improve the economics of marginal fields to atrract 
investors. The scope of study of the project includes the implementation of PSC and RSC in 
Malaysia, economic modeling, and competencies of local companies. The methodology used for 
this project is conducting critical analysis on PSC and RSC implementation and also analyzing 
the local companies’ competencies to be marginal field operators. The finding of the project 
conclude that RSC implementation in Malaysia still needs further assessment and PETRONAS 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
 
1.1.1 Oil Production 
 
 The major challenge that global upstream operators are facing currently is the decline 
of oil production due to lack of investment during the Late-2000s Recession
1
 that began in 
2007. Oil producing companies must strategically plan their exploration and production 
activities to minimize risk due to the volatile demand and price of crude oil. Oil production in 
Malaysia has been steadily decreasing since reaching a peak of 862,000 bbl/d in 2004 due to 




(Refer to appendices) 
 
1.1.2 Marginal Hydrocarbon Fields 
 The development and production of marginal fields also play important role in 
increasing profit for oil companies. . Marginal oil field is also defined as a field that can 
produce 30 million barrels of oil equivalent or less Malaysia as a major oil producer in South-
East Asia region has several marginal fields such as Berantai, Sepat, Bergading, and Balai 
Cluster. 
 
1.1.3 Economics of Hydrocarbon Production 
  Hydrocarbon production is a vital component of a nation’s economic sector.  Several 
fiscal agreements had also been used to govern the contractual system of oil and gas 
operations. In order to maintain the hydrocarbon sector as an attractive investment, the fiscal 
agreements must contain suitable share of economic rent to the government and enough 
return to the contractor as well. The correct fiscal terms are vital to enable balance between 
attracting investments and obtaining fair return to the country. Furthermore, economic rent is 
also important in a fiscal agreement. Economic rent is defined as returns in excess of supply 
price of investment, which are the returns over and above the investment necessary to 
appraise/explore, develop and produce from fields
3
. Economic rent enables the evaluation of 
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surplus between a project’s revenue and its costs and it is important to both contractor and 
the government.  
 Furthermore, another important economic aspect of hydrocarbon production is the 
contractor and government takes. It describes the contractor’s and government’s entitlement 
of gain/profit over the life of a project. In general, the government and contractor take is 
calculated using the following formula
4








 As mentioned earlier, fiscal agreements are used to determine the distribution of 
economic rent between contractor and government. For the purpose of this project, the author 
will focus on contractual arrangements which consist of Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
and Risk Service Contract (RSC) since the scope of study only involves these two. 
 
1.1.4 Competencies of Local Contractors 
 The production from marginal fields in Malaysia such as Berantai in Terengganu is 
handled by consortium made up of foreign partner and local contractors. The contractors that 
were chosen to develop the fields must be competent since the development of marginal 
fields is still new to local oil and gas industry, thus the risks involved are high. The question 
rises when the contract is given to local contractors which have no experience in handling 
marginal fields. Since the operator of marginal field also fabricates the facilities, there might 
be issue regarding cost checking. Furthermore, the huge amount of investment in marginal 
fields also poses risk to local contractors since they are relatively small companies in terms 
of market capitalization. This issue will be further discussed and elaborated in Chapter 5: 
Result & Discussion.  
 
  
Government Take (%) = Royalty + Tax + Bonus 
Contractor Take (%) = 1 – Government Take 
3 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 The Malaysian government along with state-owned company, PETRONAS have 
collaborated closely to develop marginal fields to ensure fair returns to both parties. 
Furthermore, the Risk Service Contract (RSC) has been introduced to enhance the 
development of marginal fields. Implementation of RSC in Malaysia is still new and studies 
are yet to be done to determine its effectiveness. This research will further investigate the 
viability of current fiscal agreements and challenges faced to develop marginal fields to 
upstream operators. This project is highly significant since not many studies have been done 




I. To conduct a comparative analysis between Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and 
RSC 
II. To conduct a comparative analysis between local RSC and foreign RSC 
III. To evaluate current fiscal agreements for marginal fields. 
IV. To recommend methods to improve the economics of marginal fields to attract 
investors. 
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
 
I. Implementation of PSC & RSC in Malaysia 
This project will investigate the implementation of PSC & RSC in Malaysia to study the 
competitiveness of the RSC model.  
 
II. Competencies of Local Companies 
The competencies of local companies (contractors) in dealing with marginal fields will 
also be investigated. The companies will be analyzed in terms of manpower, market share, 





1.5 Relevancy & Feasibility of Project 
   
     This project is highly relevant for the author since it will provide the author with additional 
knowledge in the discipline. Furthermore, the increasing attention for marginal field 
developments in the oil and gas industry also makes this project highly relevant. This project will 
equip the author with important knowledge in current development of hydrocarbon fields in terms 
of petroleum economics.  
 
 
      Moreover, the project have also been planned properly to ensure that it is feasible within 
the time frame of Final Year Project (FYP). The project activities have been arranged to suit the 
scope of study accordingly. For FYP I, focus is given towards literature reviews and theory while 
FYP II will focus on the analysis data and information. The methodology will be further 




















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
 2.1.1 Overview 
  PSC is the most common type of contractual arrangement around the world. This  
type of arrangement allows the government to maintain ownership to hydrocarbon resources 
and select contractor to explore and produce resources in return for a share of production
5
. 
The important elements in PSC are cost oil and profit oil. Cost oil is defined as the 
percentage of revenues that is used to recover capital costs, operating costs and exploration 
cost. In addition, profit oil is defined as remaining revenues after cost oil deduction and is 
shared between the government and contractor according to an agreed percentage.  
 
 
2.1.2 Typical PSC Structures 

















 Table 1: Typical PSC Components 
 The following figure illustrates an example of PSC flow diagrams
7
. 
The primary components of this simple PSC include the bonus, royalty, 
cost recovery limit, profit oil split and taxes. 
Summary of Commercial Terms 
Signature Bonus                            $10MM 
 Royalty Rate        10% 
Cost Recovery Limit       50% 
Government Share Profit Oil     60% 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT)     30% 
Depreciation Rate       5 year straight line 
        (20% per year) 
Analysis Summary 
Government Take  Downside Economic Upside 
     (Undiscounted)      90%     76%              75% 
Government Take 
    @ 12.5% Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)      86.5% 
Marginal Government Take       74.8% 
Effective Royalty Rate (ERR)      34% 




















  Figure 1 
 
 
2.1.3 Indonesian PSC Agreements (1966) 
 The first PSC was signed in August 1966, between Pertamina (Indonesian Oil 
Company) and IIAPCO
8. 
This PSC provided the framework for worldwide PSCs that were 
structured later. In summary, the concept was as follow: 
1. The state remained as owner of hydrocarbons. 
2. Pertamina continued management control, contractor executed the petroleum 
operations. 
3. The contractor provided all financing and technology required for the operations  








Contractor Share      Government Share 
                                                            Royalty                               $2.00 
10% 
         $18.00____ 
          $5.65                                 Cost Recovery 
      Assumed Costs   50% Limit 
      $12.35            Profit Oil 
         $4.94                                 Profit Oil Split                         $7.41 
40/60% 
         ($1.48)                  Tax Rate           $1.48 
30% 
           $3.46 
           $9.11          Division of Gross Revenues  $10.89 
           $3.46             Division of Cash Flow              $10.89 
            24%                                       Take    $76% 
$3.46/ ($20-5.65)      $10.89/ ($20-5.65) 
           53%         Entitlement                                    47% 
($5.65+4.94)/ $20      ($2.00+7.41)/ $20 
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2.1.4 Malaysian PSC Structure 




Duration          29 years from effective date; Exploration    5 years 
           Production   20 years for oil 
           20 years + 5 year holding period for Gas 
 Relinquishment        No interm relinquishment 
Exploration Obligation   Bid items 
Bonuses         None 
Royalty         10% + 0.5% Research Cess 
 Profit Oil Split and Cost Recovery 





PETRONAS Share Profit 
(Oil and Gas) 












0-1.0 70% N/A 20% N/A 60% 
1.0-1.4 60% 20% 30% 60% 70% 
1.4-2.0 50% 30% 40% 60% 70% 
2.0-2.5 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
2.5-3.0 30% 50% 60% 60% 70% 
>3.0 30% 60% 70% 60% 90% 
 









Upside Margin     
79% 82% 84% 92% 18% 54% 20ȼ Good 
 




 2.1.5 Split of Barrel under PSC Model
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2.2 Risk Service Contract (RSC) 
 
 2.2.1 Overview 
 RSCs or service contracts are agreements where a contractor provides all the capital 
required for exploring and developing a hydrocarbon block
10
. Under RSC agreement, 
government owns all production and the contractors are compensated with revenues from the 
hydrocarbon sales. The contractors will not be compensated if the exploration or 
development fails. In detail, the government allows the contractor to recover the costs during 
exploration and development through hydrocarbon sales and pay the contractor a fee 
(remuneration) that is based on percentage of the remaining revenues. RSC were being used 
in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Phillipine, and Venezuela. 
 
2.2.2 The Philippines RSC Model 
 The service contract used in Philippines is similar to most PSCs except the addition of 
Filipino Participation Incentive Allowance (FPIA) 
11
. Similar to royalty, FPIA is part of the 
service fee except that it goes to the contractor. The Philippines contract has a 70% cost 
recovery limit and the profit sharing is typically 60%/40%. However, the contractor profits 
share of 40% is not subject to taxation since the taxes are paid out of the government share of 
profit oil. The calculation of the contractor entitlement is based on the following 
assumptions: 
 






The following table describes the contractor entitlement under Philippines contract. 
 
 
Gross revenues = $100 million 
Assume Contractor Group eligible for full 7.5% FPIA 
 Cost eligible for cost recovery= $50 million – high cost case 





     Table 3: Contractor Entitlement 
Low Cost Case High Cost Case Remarks 
$100.0 MM $100.0 MM Gross revenues 
-7.5 -7.5 FPIA service fee 
92.5 92.5 Net revenues 
-20.0 -50.0 Costs recovery 
72.5 42.5 Revenues available for sharing 
-43.5 -25.5 Government 60% share 
29.0 17.0 Contractor 40% share 
+7.5 +7.5 FPIA 
$36.5 $24.5 Total contractor service free 
+20.0 +50.0 Costs recovery 
$56.5 MM $74.5 MM Total Contractor Entitlement 
45.6% 49.0% Contractor take** 
 *Total contractor service fee / (Gross reveues – cost recovery) 
 
 In the low cost case, the revenue for sharing was $80 million after deducting the $20 
million cost recovery.  The government entitlement was $43.5 mllion (43.5% or revenues) 















2.2.3 The Iranian RSC Model 
 
 In Iran, a type of buy-back agreement is implemented and it is a type of risk service 
contract. Under the buyback contract, the IOC will provide the investment costs and 
implement exploration and/or production operations for petroleum projects
12
. The IOC will 
receive remuneration fee to compensate for the initial development costs. The maximum 
remuneration fee is 60% of production under long-term export oil sale agreement 
(LTEOSA). Since its RSC implementation in 1995, Iranian government has awarded a total 




2.2.4 The Iraqi RSC Model 
 
 The net cash flow (NCF) under Iraqi RSC model can be calculated using the 





1. Total income = Contractor Remuneration + 8 Quarters CAPEX + Cost 
Recovery Allowed 
2. Total costs = OPEX + CAPEX 
  
 Calculating Contractor Remuneration 
 To calculate the contractor remuneration, the following steps are used: 
1. Cumulative CAPEX= CAPEX until field reaches handover date. 
2. Remuneration Index is assumed to be 1.5. 
3. Expected cumulative CAPEX = Maximum of cumulative CAPEX to handover date. 
 
Overall remuneration = Remuneration index * expected cumulative CAPEX 
Contractor remuneration = 10% * Revenue 
Balance to be recovered = Overall remuneration – Cumulative remuneration 
 






Cost recovery limit = 50% * Revenue 
Net Income = Total costs – Cost recovery limit 
Cumulative net incomet = Net incomet + Cumulative incomet-1 
Cost recovery allowed = Minimum between total costs and cost recovery limit 
Cost unrecovered = Cost recovery allowed – Total costs 








2.2.5 The Venezuela RSC Model 




Table 4: 1996 Risk Service Agreements “Strategic Associations” 
Area 8 to 12 areas in blocks (less than 2,000km
2
) 
Duration Exploration up to 9 years 




2 wells per 1,000km
2
 in first 4 years 




Initial Guarantee $500,000 
$50,000 
$100,000 per bid 
Royalties 16.67%  
Based on ROA= Pre-tax profit/Asset Book Value 
 Government take = Revenue – Total Costs – Contractor NCF 
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Taxation Sliding scale PEG tax levied on pre-tax profits 
PEG tax= Extra government take (0-50%) 
67.7% Corporate income taxes 
Investment tax credit limited to 2% of taxable income 
Depreciation Exploration and development drilling UOP 
Ringfencing Yes 
DMO None 
Gvt. Participation Sliding scale up to 35% 
 
 









Upside Margin     




2.3 Malaysia’s Marginal Fields Inventives 
 
The decline of oil production in Malaysia requires the government and upstream operators to 
focus on enhancing production output from existing fields or from new discoveries. Marginal fields 
can be classified in both categories; existing mature field or newly discovered field. Due to the 
smaller revenue, developing them will be economically challenging. However, there is strong drive 
to achieve production targets and obtain profit to compensate for the lower internal rate of return 
(IRR) of only 11 to 20 percent. 
 
According to Worldvest, PETRONAS is working closely with the government in three 
ways
14
. Firstly, PETRONAS will review the PSC terms and initiate new petroleum agreements. This 
method will attract investment from the operators since the economic incentives may compensate the 
14 
 
cost for field developments. Next, PETRONAS will invite operators that have specialization in 
developing marginal fields. Such operators have specific development and operating approach that is 
able to overcome the challenges of marginal fields. Lastly, collaboration among operators and 
contractors will be facilitated by PETRONAS to allow sharing of facilities and other cooperative 
methods. 
 
Moreover, there are five incentives that have been proposed by PETRONAS for development 
of marginal fields. The new incentives are expected to provide an additional RM58.2 billion of 
revenue over the next 20 years to the Government
15
. The incentives are as follow: 
 Investment tax allowance of between 60 - 100 percent of capital expenditure to be deducted 
against statutory income. This incentive will encourage the development of capital-intensive 
projects. (i.e. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), High CO2 gas fields, High Pressure High 
Temperature (HPHT), Deepwater and Infrastructure projects for Petroleum Operations)  
 Reduced tax rate from 38% to 25% for marginal oil field development in order to improve 
profitability of the field developments. 
 Accelerated Capital Allowance to 5 years from 10 years for marginal oil field development to 
improve project viability.  
 Qualifying Exploration Expenditure transfer between non-contiguous petroleum agreement 
with the same partnership or sole proprietor to enhance contractors’ risk taking attitude, 
which could encourage higher level of exploration activity.  
 Waiver of export duty on oil produced and exported from marginal oil field development to 








2.4 Malaysia’s Risk Service Contract (RSC)  
 One of the current economic incentives is the RSC. PETRONAS have been implementing 
RSC for marginal field development purposes. The structure for current RSCs is listed below
16
: 
 Marginal Fields are located within a producing block and its main product is oil.  
 The International Oil Company (IOC) provides technical, financial, managerial or 
commercial services to the state from exploration through production.  
 Risk service contracts – the IOC bears all the exploration costs.  
 Petronas retains ownership of oil.  
 The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is estimated at between 7 – 20% subject to terms and 
conditions as compared to at least 25% for conventional oil fields
17
. 
 Contractor receives fee payment commencing from first production and throughout the 
duration of the contract. 
 Fee is subject to taxes – but to incentivise investment in marginal fields Malaysia has 


















 Chapter 3: Methodology 
 






 Based on the diagram, this project will emphasize on research works regarding marginal field 
economics. After the title selection, preliminary research will be done. During this stage, the 
background of the problem is identified and literature reviews are conducted to gather as much 
information as possible regarding the topic.  
 
 Next, the procedure for analyzing local companies will be as follow: 
Title Selection
•Selection of the most 
appropriate final year 
project title
Prelim Research
•Understanding  on the 
fundamental theories and 
concepts, and performing a 
literature reviews
Data Gathering of 
Annual Reports
Gather and analyze 
data from annual 
reports
Discussion of Analysis
•Discuss the findings and 
determine if the 
objective has been met
Report Writing
•Compilation of all research 
findings, literature reviews and 






 Income statement shows the transactions completed over a specific accounting period. In this 
statement, we have three key pointers: the current level of revenue; high growth in revenue; 
and the profits made in proportion to the level of revenue. 
 
 Revenue indicates the size of a company. Growth in revenue implies that the company has 
been expanding over the past period.  
 
 The profits made in proportion to the level of revenue indicate whether this company has 
high or low profit margins in its products. The profits here refer to the profit after tax or net 
income.  
 
 Cash flows of a company need to be analyzed to determine whether the company is 
generating cash from its activities. A healthy company should show high operating cash flow 
because this number will indicate how much actual cash the company has generated from 
operations during the period.   
 
 Track record describes the performance history of a company and it allows us to investigate 













Project Gannt Chart 
Table 5: FYP I Gannt Chart 
No. Details/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Topic Selection/Proposal              
2 Preliminary Research Work              
3 Project Flow Planning              
4 Submission of Proposal Defense 
Report 
             
5 Project research (Literature Review, 
Data Gathering) 
             
6 Oral presentation              
7 Submission of Interim Draft Report              













Figure 8: FYP II Gannt Chart 
No. Details/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Project work continues                 
2 Submission of Progress Report                 
3 Project work continues                 
4 Pre-EDX & 
Submission of Final Report 
(Soft bound) 
                
5 EDX                 
6 Final Oral Presentation                 
7 Submission of Technical 
Paper 
                
8 Submission of Dissertation 
(Hard bound) 
             
 



































No  Activities  Date  
1  Submission of Proposal Defense Report (Prelim)  3 Nov 2011 (W6)  
2 Proposal Defense (Oral Presentation)  15 Nov – 25 Nov (W8-9) 
3 Submission of Interim Draft Report  15 Dec 2011  (W12)  





Figure 10: FYP II Key Milestone 
 
No  Activities  Date  
1  Submission of Progress Report 16 Mac 2012 (Week 8)  
2 Pre-EDX & Submission of Final Report (Softbound)  2 April 2012 (Week 11) 
3 EDX  9 April 2012  (Week 12)  
4 Oral Presentation  23 April 2012 (Week 14)  
5 Submission of Dissertation 11 May 2012 (Week 16) 
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4. Result & Discussion 
 
4.1 Comparative Analysis between PSC and RSC 
 
  The comparative analysis between PSC and RSC can be divided into several factors 
which are development cost and excess development cost, technological advancement, 
production sharing, and upside and downside risks.  
 
  In terms of development cost, both the operator and contractor will provide the 
capital cost for development as agreed in the PSC fiscal agreement. Should the project 
require more cost than as planned, it will be shared between the operator and contractor. 
The higher cost required may be due to changes in development activities, such as 
fabrication/transport costs. However, in RSC the development cost and excess development 
cost are fully provided by contractor.  
 
  Furthermore, PSC also encourage the contractor to enhance their technology to 
optimize production under PSC since the risks are shared in cost recovery terms. In RSC, 
the capital allowance of between 60%-100% also encourages the technology enhancement 
such as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) and High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT)
 16
.    
 
  Next, the production revenues under PSC model determine the profit oil sharing   
which has been described earlier. For example, the profit oil split is 40% (to contractor)  
 and 60% (to government). On the other hand, production revenues in RSC model 
 determine the remuneration fees for contractor.  
 
   Other than that, the upside and downside risk under PSC are shared between 
operator and contractor. The example of downside risk is the actual reserve recovered. For 
example, if the actual reserve recovered from the reservoir is less than expected, the risk is 
shared between both. Under RSC, the contractor bears a higher risk in terms of less 
remuneration fees if the production is not up to their target. Other than that, upside risk such 




  The comparative analysis is simplified in the following table: 
 
Table 9: PSC and RSC Comparative Analysis 
Comparison PSC RSC 
Development Cost Shared among operator 
and contractor 
Fully by contractor 
Excess development 
cost 
Shared Fully by contractor 
Technology Contractor may enhance 
technology application 
due to cost recovery 
High capital allowance 
encourage the contractor 
to use enhanced 
technology 
Production revenues Determines profit-oil 
sharing 
Determines the 
remuneration fee for 
contractor 
Upside and Downside 
Risks 
 
Shared  Contractor bears greater 




4.2 Drawbacks of RSC Model 
 
  Firstly, contractor has to deal with greater risk under RSC model since they have 
 to deal with development and operation cost. They also have to bear the upside and 
 downside risks. On the contrary, PSC enable the sharing of  risks due to existence of 







  Next, the RSC model also has a short contract life. In Malaysia, RSC is planned to 
 be implemented up to 15 years only which is much shorter than PSC implementation. The 
 short life will not motivate the contractors to implement measures to maximize life of 
 field.  In other words, the contractors will not focus on reservoir performance in the long 
 run. 
 Furthermore, one of the reasons for PETRONAS to include local contractors in 
partnership with foreign companies is for technology transfer. However, the short contract 
duration in RSC will limit the technology transfer and local companies may not be able to 
learn much from foreign players. This is contrary with PSC where local companies are 
given much longer period to collaborate with foreign companies. 
 
4.3 Info and Data Analysis: SapuraCrest Petroleum & Kencana Petroleum 
 4.3.1 Background and Experience of Local Companies 
 
  The background and experience of local companies that are involved as operators 
 of marginal fields (SapuraCrest and Kencana Petroleum) are analyzed by dissecting these 
 companies’ annual report. (Refer Appendices for further reference)  
  
 SapuraCrest Petroleum 
  
  SapuraCrest Petroleum is a local service provider company that has been involved 
 in shallow and deepwater hydrocarbon production. The company’s current major 
 involvement is the deepwater offshore installation works at Gumusut-Kakap field in 
 Sabah after the success of Kikeh development project. Another project by this company is 
 the decommissioning project in Japan (Iwaki Platform). SapuraCrest also had succesfully 
 undertaken the transportation and installation project of offshore facilities in Australia. 
 Furthermore, SapuraCrest had also involved in drilling activities where it is currently 
 operating five drilling rigs owned by ExxonMobil and PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd. 
 Besides, the company also provided services in offshore platform maintenance services 
 such as geotechnical and geophysical surveys and hook-up & commissioning. 
25 
 
 Kencana Petroleum 
 
  Kencana Petroleum is a local service provider involved in fabrication, hook-up & 
 commisioning, procurement, and construction of offshore facilities. The company had 
 involved in fabrication works for Newfield’s processing platform and Gorgon LNG plant 
 for Saipem France. In drilling activities, the company had also started a drilling service 
 contract with PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd. Moreover, the company had also 
 strengthened  its capabilities in subsea components fabrication after the acquisition of 
 Allied Marine & Equipment (AME) where they cover provision of offshore diving 
 and underwater-related services such as construction, repairing, and installation. Most of 
 the company’s revenues are generated from fabrication contracts. 
 




Profit After Tax 
(RM Million) 
‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 
SapuraCrest Petroleum 3,451.7 3,257.0   3,180.0 249.8   335.3   374.5 
Kencana Petroleum 1,141 1,090 1,493 118 136 223 






















  The involvement of SapuraCrest Petroleum and Kencana Petroleum as marginal  
 field operators raises the issue of these companies’ capabilities to be field operators. In  
 terms of experience, both companies have wide experience in fabrication and hook-up & 
 commisioning (HUC) projects. However, both companies have no experience as field 
 operators and their competencies as operators are questionable.  
 
  Moreover, both companies are succesful as service providers due to PETRONAS’ 
 policy to include local contractors in PSC projects. Hence, higher service cost will be 
 compensated by PETRONAS as the owner of the PSC. It is a differenct case in RSC 
 implementation where both companies are operators and they need to provide all the 
 costs related to the development project before remuneration period. The operators may 
 need the technology and expertise to determine the optimum production levels. The risks 
 exposed to operators are significantly high since they need to strictly meet key 
 performance indicators (KPI) such as production rate and production capacity. Should the 
 KPIs are failed to be met, operators will face serious consequence such as penalties or no 
 remuneration fee. The worst case will happen if the operators are not compensated since 















  Furthermore, according to the financial data both companies are making profit 
 consistently since year 2009. However, both companies need to provide the development 
 capital amounting to RM600 million each which is relatively high as compared to their 
 yearly  profit.  The invesment is really aggressive towards the operators since there is
 risk of  not getting compensated as described previously. Hence, the financial capabilities

























5. Conclusion  
  
  In conclusion, the implementation of RSC in Malaysia for marginal fields’ development 
still needs further consideration due to several reasons. Firstly, the competencies of local 
companies to be operators are disputable. Secondly, the comparative analysis shows that the risks 
exposed to local companies (contractors) are significantly higher than that of PSC model.  
Lastly, RSC model is too rigid to be implemented because it is insensitive to oil price and changes 
in found reserves. 
 
 Furthermore, PETRONAS should reveal more regarding the RSC model in Malaysia to 
allow more in-depth research to be conducted. Increased transparency will enable the researchers 
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